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RISING INEQUALITY IN THE EU
THE ELEPHANT IN THE ROOM
Rising inequality is the elephant in the European room: everybody knows it
is there and that it is an obvious problem, but no one wants to either discuss the
problem or address it. Macroeconomic issues have taken the front seat, and
inequality might be dropped in the conversation when it has relevance from a
macroeconomic perspective: maybe we should reduce inequality to fight secular
stagnation (Fitoussi and Saraceno, 2011), especially because inequality can be
self-reinforcing through secular stagnation; maybe we should reduce inequality to
enhance growth in a world of credit-constraint households, because growth is the
final goal of our policies (Birdsall et al. 1996). The fact that, maybe, we should aim
for socio-economic equality for itself and not for some other macroeconomic
objective seems to have disappeared in the presence of other urgencies. Paradox-
ically, Thomas Piketty’s Capital in the 21st Century has spurred a global debate, but
not a European one. The Capital is on everybody’s lips from New-York to Hong-
Kong through Rio, but not in Brussels—although it is in everybody’s mind, hence
the Elephant in the Room. But, perhaps it is so because Piketty has placed atten-
tion on high and very high income, which is less of a subject in stagnating
economies.
Important questions are not being raised, or are not heard enough: what does
socio-economic equality even means in a European perspective? Should we worry
about regional convergence as we traditionally do in Europe? We see in the
present chapter that European regional convergence stopped with the crisis.
Should we worry about household income inequality at the national level? The
situation is more ambiguous, some countries are experiencing a decrease in
inequality while others are experiencing an increase. In many countries, social
transfers have so far mitigated the rise in market income inequality. Should we
worry about absolute or relative poverty? We show that absolute poverty, meas-
ured by material deprivation has risen a lot in recent years. Or, should we worry
about household income inequality at the European level? Eurostat does not
follow the path of Milanovic (2012), formerly at the World Bank, who advocates
the use of a Global Income Gini which analyses the distribution of individual
income around the world regardless of national residence. The only EU Income
Gini calculated by Eurostat is the average of national Gini coefficients. National
and regional convergence are also analyzed but both approaches (between-
groups and within-groups inequality) are never combined. Household inequalities
are always measured at the national level, and not at the European level. It has
been argued it is legitimate because it is the level of the political community, at
which public policies are implemented. But what are the European Union and the
euro area if not political communities of some sort? Aren’t public policies imple-
mented as well throughout the European Union and the Eurozone? When
18 nations share a common currency and pursue fiscal consolidation in the name
of a common public good, isn’t it time for them to think of a way to consider the
question of justice, at least in its economic dimension? 
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Ironically, the euro area crisis, which arguably is fundamentally due to a delib-
erate choice of an absence of between-states solidarity, has not really spurred the
global debate over euro area or EU Economic justice, even though there are some
partial debates, notably over the Banking Union, and a European Unemployment
Insurance Scheme (Jara and Sutherland, 2013). The analysis included in this
chapter shows an increase in European inequality and poverty following the crisis,
in part due to rising unemployment. If on average, national Gini coefficients are
fairly stable over time, the global European Gini has risen since 2009, 97% of the
increase being the consequence of the rise of inequality between countries.  
In his book, Piketty argues for the implementation of a Wealth Tax at the
European Level, at first at very low rates. One point is that with taxation comes
knowledge. Indeed, it’s very difficult to know today the level of concentration of
wealth in Europe: as discussed in the chapter, surveys of wealth have considerable
flaws. Our knowledge of the distribution of income is due to the implementation
of income tax. Income tax data are a lot more reliable than declarative survey
data. Taxing wealth even at very low rates would therefore improve our knowl-
edge of the world. It would not be absurd to do it among the countries which
form the banking union. Definitely, a banking union implies some solidarity. From
an individual perspective, there is a Deposit Guarantee Scheme (harmonized but
left to national responsibility) that covers deposits up to €100.000. However, in
the absence of wealth consolidation across banks, the protection ceiling must be
understood per depositor per bank, meaning the same depositor can be covered
up to €1.000.000 if she deposits in 10 different banks. This seems neither equi-
table nor efficient. Individual wealth taxation, and therefore wealth tax returns,
would give knowledge of whom, individually, is actually rescued when the banks
are rescued or deposits guaranteed, a first small step towards European economic
justice. Cyprus has proven that the worst case scenario can happen and that
justice is then a primary concern: perceived injustice might hinder a swift response
in case of emergency. 
With better knowledge, we believe there will come better deliberation and
therefore better policies. But knowledge comes first, which is one reason we do
not engage in a detailed policy agenda at this point. Europe is in a unique situa-
tion because nation-states have not given up sovereignty but shared it with a
higher level. The European Union is not one single nation, like the United States,
and it probably never will be. We probably need to adopt a cosmopolitical
perspective with several levels of interaction: within nations, between nations, but
also between individuals across the European political community. European insti-
tutions are needed to animate this public debate (Parodi, 2013). European
economic justice is a missing part in Piketty’s Capital in the 21st Century, which
might also explain why inequalities are like an elephant in the European room. 
1. The end of regional convergence
Regional convergence is the traditional way to assess inequality across the
European Union. The European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), established
in 1975 is the first, and still main policy instrument aimed at reducing inequality
across Europe. Prior to the crisis, a regional convergence could be observed.
Figure 1 shows that between 2000 and 2008, the Nuts 2 regions which enjoyed
the greatest average annual growth are also the ones with the lowest initial level
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of GDP, which implies convergence between European regions. It can be argued
that this convergence was obtained at the cost of an unsustainable dynamic (like
in Greece). This point is rather difficult to prove or to dismiss, and can be made as
a general caveat to all kind of convergence processes. Nevertheless, by itself
convergence is not unexpected from a theoretical point of view, and it seems that
the burden of the proof should be on the doubters.
The great recession has not been felt equally in Europe. Obviously, some
regions have been hurt more than others. Figure 2 shows a different picture from
figure 1, consistent with the end of regional convergence. It can however be said
that the crisis has stopped regional convergence in the EU.  
Map 1 shows which regions benefited from the highest growth between
2008 and 2011. It is clear that national borders keep their importance: regions
which enjoy lower growth are found mostly in Greece, Spain, United Kingdom,
while German, Swedish and Bulgarian regions enjoy higher growth. Despite that
observation, regions of a given country do not share a common evolution.
Regions of Italy, Spain or UK are decidedly heterogeneous in their fate.
Figure 1. 2000-2008: Regional convergence in the EU
Note: Size of circles are proportional to population.
Sources: Eurostat, iAGS calculations.
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Figure 2. 2008-2011:The end of Regional convergence in the EU
Note: Size of circles are proportional to population.
Sources: Eurostat, iAGS calculations.
Map 1. Change of GDP per inhabitant by NUTS 2 Regions, 2008-2011 (In %)
Source: Eurostat.
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2. European labour market still suffers
Six years after the economic crisis, European labour markets still suffer in the
wake. Although it seems that the tide is turning, unemployment rates are still sky
high in many countries. Employment, depressed by the crisis has continued to
decrease after the European countries took austerity measures in 2011, but has
finally begun to increase in 2013, since that year employment is up by 2 million
people. Combined with a shrinking labor force, this has caused a turnaround in
the unemployment rate in 2014. But the recovery is still very slow.
The level of long-term unemployment is still dangerously high. Figure 3
shows that long-term unemployment in EU28 is slowly decreasing, but the level is
still very high with just over 5 percent of the labor force, corresponding to some
12 million people, having been unemployed for a year or more. After a rapid rise
in the Euro area since 2011, long-term unemployment seems to have stabilized
during the last year, but with more than 6 percent of the labor force corre-
sponding to some 9½ million people, who have been without work for more than
12 months, long-term unemployment within the Euro zone remains at its highest
level since the outbreak of the crisis.
Increasing unemployment has impacted each member state differently.
Figure 4 shows the long-term unemployment rate before and after the crisis.
Germany is the only country which has a lower rate of long-term unemployment
today than before the crisis broke out in 2008. The countries with increases below
one percentage point are Luxembourg, Malta, Austria, Finland and Belgium. At
the other end of the scale Spain has had an increase of 11 percentage points and
Greece of almost 15 percentage points.
Figure 3. Unemployment
  In %                                                                                                                                   
Note: 2015 iAGS forecast.
Source: Eurostat.
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Long-term unemployment is only expected to drop slowly in the course of
2015. In 2015 long-term unemployment could well be around 11½ million
people in the EU-28 and around 9 million in the Euro area. From a historical point
of view these are still alarming levels of long-term unemployment.
The slow speed of the economic recovery in Europe may marginalize people
in even longer-term unemployment. Even though long-term unemployment and
unemployment in general is decreasing in EU28, the number of people being
unemployed for more than 48 months is still increasing. This suggests that long-
term unemployed bear a high risk of being marginalized and have a harder time
finding a job after being away from employment. In EU28 the number of people
being unemployed for more than 48 months has increased from 1.8 million
people before the crisis to 3.1 million people in the second quarter of 2014. For
the euro area the number has increased from 1.5 million people to 2.6 million
people in the same period. This means that one in four long-term unemployed
have been away from employment more than 48 months. There is an imminent
risk of long-term unemployment becoming structural and there is therefore need
for more active labor market policy and economic growth to reverse the trend in
order to prevent hysteresis effects.
Young people have struggled to find work during the crisis. The level of youth
unemployment remains high. In the EU28, 5 million people between 15-24 years
are unemployed, while the number is 3.3 million people in the euro area. Of the
5 million unemployed young people in EU28 more than 1.8 million, or more than
one in three, have been unemployed for more than 12 months. In the euro area
the number is more than 1.3 million people which correspond to around
40 percent of youth unemployment also being long-term unemployment.
In some countries the youth unemployment rate has skyrocketed with unem-
ployment rates exceeding 50 percent. Many young people are however not
an active part of the labor market and instead of looking at the traditional youth
Figure 4. Long term unemployment
In %                                                                                                                                      
Note: Prior to crisis is 2008 and today is 2013.
Source: Eurostat.
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unemployment rates it is also useful to look at unemployment ratios, i.e.
the number of young unemployed as a share of the population (Figure 5 and
Figure 6). 
The unemployment ratio for the 15-24 year olds is around 10 percent in both
the EU and the Euro area which from a historical perspective is a very high level.
Youth unemployment ratios are very high in the troubled countries in
southern Europe. Thus in Spain and Greece 16.5 percent and 21 percent of the
youths are unemployed while it is only around 5 percent of the youths in
Luxembourg, Germany and Austria.  
Figure 5. Youth unemployment ratio
 In %                                                                                                                                   
Source: Eurostat.
Figure 6. Youth unemployment ratios, selected countries
 In %                                                                                                                                    
Note: seasonally adjusted data. Prior to crisis is 2008 and today is 2013.
Source: Eurostat.
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Instead of looking at unemployment among youths which can also include
young people who no longer at school but can’t find a job one can also look at
NEET-rates that measure the share of young people active or not active who are
Not in Employment nor in Education or Training (hence, NEET). 
Figure 7 shows the NEET-rates in the individual EU-countries for the 15-
29 year olds prior to the crisis (2008) and today (2013). As one can see many of
the countries that experience the highest unemployment rates among young
people are also among the countries that have the highest NEET-rates.
Map 2 shows the regional evolution of unemployment between 2008 and
2011. We can see that regions in Southern Europe and Ireland clearly suffered the
sharpest increases. It is especially striking to see how easily recognisable national
borders are. For example, German territories are not easily mixed up with French
territories and French territories are not mixed up with Spanish ones.
Figure 7. NEET-rates (young people not employed nor in education or training)
In %                                                                                                                                  
Source: Eurostat.
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Box 1. Recession and austerity: Gender equality jeopardized 1
The crisis that began in 2008 has hit European countries diversely, causing
economic and labour market disequilibria of greater or smaller magnitude. As
with past global crises, the current one has gendered implications. While
women’s employment is said to be preserved relative to men’s in the early
stage of a recession, austerity plans implemented in several countries to limit
public deficits and debts are deemed to affect female workers more deeply. A
special issue of the Revue de l'OFCE (Eydoux et al., 2014) sheds light on the
gendered dimensions of the current crisis and related policies' impacts on Euro-
pean labour markets. It notably points out the (temporary) protective role of
the gendered segregation of labour markets (i.e. the fact that women and men
do not work in the same sectors or occupations): male-dominated sectors
(construction, industry, etc.) are generally first hit in recession, while female-
dominated sectors (services and the public sector) remain quite sheltered from
a quick drop in the demand for labour—but are exposed to job losses at a later
stage. This special issue explores the relevance of common hypothesis about
the gender impact of recession and austerity: the segregation and buffer effects
on the demand side and the discouraged-worker or added-worker effects on
the supply side of the labour market. The timing of recessions also differs across
Map 2. Change in unemployment by NUTS 2 Regions, 2008-2011 (In %)
Source: Eurostat.
1. This box is a contribution from Anne Eydoux (CEE), Antoine Math (IRES) and Hélène Périvier
(OFCE)
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countries. Several phases with different gender implications often alternate: the
recession, the austerity phases, and an intermediate phase of recovery. When it
comes to the analysis of crisis related policies, the phases may however be over-
lapping instead of alternating, for instance when austerity measures are
implemented prior to the crisis—eventually in line with European economic
governance rules or with a previous downturn. 
In Germany, female employment has apparently been spared from the effects
of recession in quantitative terms, the focus is on the low quality of women's
jobs. In central and eastern Europe, as well as in southern countries such as
Greece, Portugal and Spain, male and female employment has been so deeply
affected that poverty and material deprivation have increased for all. In the UK,
the impact of the recession and austerity has been selective, increasing existing
inequalities by gender and by ethnicity, as well as within each category. In
Sweden, where the public sector is widespread and female-dominated, the
impact of recessions on women's employment has been delayed, occurring in
austerity phases through the downsizing of the local government sector.
Finally, the long-term changes in labour market or public policies induced by
the recession and austerity affect the trends in female and male employment.
In many European countries, changes in public policies are liable to jeopardize
the progresses towards gender equality.
3. Rising poverty and material deprivation
Many Europeans have experienced decreases in living standards during the
crisis, resulting in increases in poverty rates. The anchored risk-of-poverty rate is
the preferred measure when analyzing changes in poverty over time, as the
median income is anchored in a specific year, in this case 2008 (see chapter 2 in
the iAGS 2014 for an elaboration on the difference between different poverty
measures and the difference between anchored and un-anchored poverty rates). 
An increase in the anchored poverty risk over time indicates that the living
standards of low-income households are worsening compared to the base year
(2008), and a decrease indicates that living standards are improving. The risk of
poverty has increased mostly in a number of southern and eastern European
countries (Figure 8). Greece stands out with an increase in the risk of poverty of
nearly 25 percentage points, and this from one of the highest starting points: the
risk of poverty has increased from 20 pct. to nearly 45 pct. (with respect to 2008
median income), with the largest increases in the last two years. On the other
hand the risk of poverty has decreased in eastern European countries like Poland,
Slovakia and Romania. 
The change in the anchored poverty rate since 2008 is highly correlated with
the change in GDP, confirming that the countries which have been hit the hardest
during the crisis are also the countries which have experienced the highest
increase in poverty (relative to 2008 income) (See Figure 9).
The severe material deprivation rate is another poverty indicator. Instead of
looking at income, the severe material deprivation rate shows how individuals
experience inadequate access to basic amenities. Severe material deprivation is a
more narrow indicator than the at-risk-of-poverty rate. Other measures such as
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the poverty rate and Gini-coefficient of income can be difficult to compare
between countries and over time because they measure relative inequality. The
severe material deprivation rate is defined as the declared inability to pay for a
certain number of necessary items (see box 2 for a more detailed description of
the severe material deprivation rate).   
Figure 8. Change in the risk of anchored poverty 2008-2013
In %
Note: (*) latest data from 2012. (**) latest data from 2011 due to breaks in time series. (***) latest data
from 2012 due to breaks in time series.
Source: Eurostat.
Figure 9. Correlation between change in GDP/capita and change
in anchored poverty 2008-2013
                                                                                                                                             In %
Note: (*) latest data from 2012. (**) latest data from 2011 due to break in time series.
Source: Eurostat.
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Box 2. Definition of severe material deprivation rate
The severe material deprivation rate is an EU-SILC indicator based on the
affordability of a selection of items (goods or services) considered to be neces-
sary or desirable for people to have an 'acceptable' standard of living in the
country where they live. The indicator distinguishes between individuals who
cannot afford a certain good or service, and those who do not have this good
or service for another reason, e.g. because they do not want or do not need it.
The severe material deprivation rate is defined as the enforced inability to pay
for at least four of the below-mentioned items. 
1.  to pay their rent, mortgage or utility bills;
2.  to keep their home adequately warm;
3.  to face unexpected expenses;
4.  to eat meat or proteins regularly; 
5.  to go on holiday;
6.  a television set;
7.  a washing machine; 
8.  a car;
9.  a telephone.
Souce: EU-SILC (Eurostat).
Figure 10 shows the change in the severe material deprivation rate since
2008. Greece and Hungary, followed by a number of southern and eastern Euro-
pean countries, have experienced the highest increases in severe material
deprivation. 
Figure 11 shows the change in the severe deprivation rate for children. The
ranking among the countries mirrors to a large extent the ranking for the overall
severe deprivation rate. In Hungary and Greece severe material deprivation has
increased by 13 percent or more since 2008. There is a tendency that the rate
among children has increased more than the average rate, indicating that chil-
dren are hit harder by material deprivation than other age groups. Growing
deprivation among children is very concerning since lack of opportunities during
childhood is likely to have long-term consequences for the concerned individuals
as well as for society as a whole.
As shown in Figure 12, the increase in the severe material deprivation rate is
mainly driven by an increase for the unemployed and other inactive persons (i.e.
not retired). In other words, the rate has increased much more for people outside
the labour market than for employed and retired individuals, resulting in close to
one out of four unemployed experiencing material deprivations.  
 Figure 13 shows the correlation between change in GDP and change in
severe material deprivation from 2008-2013. There is a clear negative relation-
ship, meaning that the countries whose economies where hit the hardest during
the crisis are also the countries that have experienced the highest increases in
severe material deprivation.
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Figure 10. Change in severe material deprivation rate 2008-2013
Change in percentage points                                                         
Note: (*) latest data from 2012. (**) latest data from 2011 due to break in time series.
Source: Eurostat
Figure 11. Change in severe material deprivation among children 
(0-18 years) 2008-2013
 Change in percentage points                                                       
Note: (*) latest data from 2012. (**) latest data from 2011 due to break in time series.
Source: Eurostat.
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The same picture is shown when looking at changes in unemployment and
changes in severe material deprivation. There is a clear positive correlation
between the two, indicating that a large increase in unemployment results in a
large increase in severe material deprivation.
Figure 12. Development in severe material deprivation by activity status 
in the euro area
 In %                                                                                                                                     
Source: Eurostat.
Figure 13. Correlation between change in SMD and change in GDP/capita 
2008-2013
In %
Note: (*) last data from 2012. (**) last data from 2011 due to break in time series.
Source: Eurostat.
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4.  The drivers of material deprivation
The descriptive analysis above clearly suggests that there has been some
correlation between the changes in GDP, unemployment, social protection
expenditures the severe material deprivation across Europe.
In the following we have taken an econometric approach in looking at the
drivers of material deprivation. By panel data estimation we have estimated the
following equation:
ΔSMD = α ΔGDP + β ΔGDP-1 + γ ΔLTUNR-1 + δ ΔSPE-1 + C + μ
where the dependent variable is:
ΔSMD, the change in the severe material deprivation rate
and the explanatory variables are:
ΔGDP, the growth rate in GDP per capita
ΔLTUNR-1, the lagged change in the long term unemployment rate
ΔSPE-1, the lagged percentage change in social protection expenditure
(SPE) volumes (euros/inhabitant)
C, a constant term 
and μ,the error term
Figure 14. Correlation between change in unemployment and change in SMD 
2008-2013
In %
Note: (*) last data from 2012. (**) last data from 2011 due to break in time series.
Source: Eurostat.
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As seen from the regression results in Table 1, all the variables are significant.
The change in GDP per capita both in the same as well as in the year before has a
very significant negative influence on the change in material deprivation,
meaning that negative growth in GDP per capita tends to increase the severe
material deprivation rate both in the current year and the year after. If GDP per
capita (in volumes) shrinks by 1 percent it will on average pull up the severe
material deprivation rate by 0.1 percentage points in the current year and in the
year after. 
Also, long-term unemployment is an important driver for material depriva-
tion. If long-term unemployment increases by one percentage point the severe
material deprivation rate will follow in the year after with an increase corre-
sponding to 0.3 percentage points. When determining some of the drivers of
material deprivation, we also tried including the change in unemployment in the
equation, but the change in unemployment turned out to have a less significant
influence on material deprivation compared to long-term unemployment. This
result confirms the expectation that unemployment in itself does not necessarily
lead to material deprivation, as people tend to start using their savings when they
get unemployed. Once they have been unemployed for a while the savings run
out, however, and the unemployment leads to material deprivation. Long-term
unemployment (but not necessarily short-term unemployment) is therefore an
important source of poverty and material deprivation.
Finally we find a significant negative effect from the change in the expendi-
tures on social protection. This indicates that austerity is also a leading driver
increases in material deprivation. The estimates suggest that that the more a
country tightens its fiscal policy, in the form of decreasing social protection
expenditures, the larger the increases in material deprivation. If social protection
expenditures (in volumes euros per inhabitant) decrease by one percent then it
will lead to an increase in the severe material deprivation rate of 0.04 percentage
points in the year after. 
The regression results support the idea that poverty and material deprivation
are closely connected to not only the economic cycle and the development on
the labour market, but also to policies influencing social protection. 
Table 1. Effects on the change in severe material deprivation (ΔSMD)
Coefficient  Std     T-value
Growth rate in GDP/per capita (α) -0.115 0.032 -3.65
Lagged growth rate in GDP/per capita (β) -0.113 0.040 -2.79
Lagged change in the long term unemp.rate (γ) 0.313 0.117 2.68
Lagged percentage change in SPE (δ) -0.039 0.013 -3.06
Constant 0.102 0.113 0.90
R2 = 42
Number of countries : 27
Number of observations : 185
Wald (joint):Chi2(4) = 48,46 [0.000]
Note: We tested for both autocorrelation and unit root and neither are found in the data.
Sources: Eurostat and iAGS calculations.
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5. Rising European inequality of income
When it comes to measuring income distribution and relative inequalities,
the Gini coefficient of equivalised disposable income is the main indicator. The
Gini coefficient ranges from 0 to 1, where the Gini is zero in a country where all
people have the same equalized disposable income (perfect equality), and 1 in
the case where one person has all the income (perfect inequality). Gini is an indi-
cator of relative inequality in the sense that if all income increases or decreases
by the same percentage the Gini will not change. For the last 5 years, since the
crisis broke out, there is large spread in the variation of the Gini coefficient
throughout Europe. There are large increases in some countries, notably
southern European countries such as Cyprus, Spain, Italy and Greece. On the
other hand income inequality has decreased in the Netherlands and Portugal
(Figure 15). In Portugal this is explained by the fact that top income were hurt
even more than low-income. 
Another way to measure income inequality is through income decile shares.
This allows us to decompose inequality change into what is driven by the bottom
and what is driven by the top of the income ladder. Figure 16 shows the evolution
of inequality in the top of the income scale (S10/S6) as well as the evolution in the
bottom (S6/S1). S10/S6 is the ratio of the share of income earned by the richest
10 pct. (S10) to the share of income earned by the 6th decile of equalized income
(S6). An increase in S6/S1 indicates an increase in inequality in the bottom part of
the income ladder since the income earned by the poorest has decreased rela-
tively to the income received by the 6th decile. We can see in Figure 16 that the
rise in inequality in Spain, Greece, and Italy is mainly driven by a rise in inequality
in the bottom part of the distribution. In Portugal and in Romania, the rise in
Figure 15. Change in Gini coefficient 2008-2013
Note: (*) last data from 2012. (**) last data from 2011 due to break in time series. (***) last data from 2012
due to break in time series.
Source: Eurostat
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inequality in the bottom part of the distribution is offset by a decrease in
inequality in the top part of the distribution. Between 2008 and 2013, most coun-
tries that experienced a decrease in the Gini coefficient have seen a fall of
inequality in the top of the distribution.     
Concerning regional inequality of disposable income, we can see the same
convergence/divergence trends as with GDP (Figures 1 and 2): the convergence
that was occurring before the crisis stopped after 2008. 
Figure 17 compares the global European Gini of household equivalised
disposable income to the level of national Gini coefficients. The global European
Gini compares household income regardless of national residence. Eurostat does
not calculate a European Gini: we used microdata (EU-SILC) to do it. There might
be some small differences with the Gini coefficients calculated by Eurostat, partly
explained by the treatment of negative income (we exclude them). 
The Figure shows that Europe as a whole is more unequal than any other
country in the union. Inequality in the European Union is in fact comparable to
that prevailing in the United States. 
Figure 18 shows the evolution of European global inequality, which compares
all households regardless of residence. In the European Union as a whole, while
inequality was rapidly falling between 2008 and 2009, it has been rising since
2009. In 2012, global inequality is slightly higher in the European Union than in
the United States. Global inequality is much lower in the Eurozone but it is also
rising since 2010. The Gini in the EU27, as calculated by Eurostat is also shown in
the figure. It is much lower than the global European Gini. It is also stable between
2009 and 2012 whereas global Gini is strongly increasing. Eurostat's statistics on
inequality do not reflect the divergence between countries since 2009. 
Figure 16. Evolution between 2008 and 2013 of share of national equivalised 
income
 In percentage points                                                      
Note: (*) last data from 2012. (**) last data from 2011 due to break in time series. (***) last data from 2012
due to break in time series.
Source: Eurostat.
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For the EU, the Figure uses both the Gini and the Theil index. The Theil index
is another statistic used to measure economic inequality. It is very comparable to
the Gini coefficient. As the Figure 18 shows, the differences in the evolution of the
two measures are fairly small.  
Figure 17. Gini of household equivalised disposable income across Europe 
and European global Gini 
Sources: EU-SILC, iAGS calculations. 
Figure 18. Evolution of inequality in EU, Eurozone and United States  
Sources: EU-SILC, OECD, iAGS calculations.  
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Unlike Gini, Theil index can be decomposed into between-groups inequality
and within-groups inequality. The decomposition allows us to distinguish what
part of inequality is due to inequality within the groups, here within member
states (MS), and what is due to inequality between MS. The within-group
inequality is just the weighted average of the Theil index within each nation. The
between-group inequality is the inequality that would prevail if individuals (here,
households) within each MS earned the average national income, i.e. if there were
no inequality within each nation. Figure 19 shows that the increase in inequality
since 2009 is mainly due to an increase in between-countries inequality. In fact,
97% of the increase in global European inequalities since 2009 is due to the diver-
gence between countries.
6. High concentration of wealth in the Eurozone2
Since the onset of the economic and financial crisis, there has been a growing
interest in assessing the financial stability of the household sector. This is closely
related to the distribution of wealth in private households in the Eurozone.
Against this background, the European Central Bank collected data on private
wealth with the Household Finance and Consumption Survey (HFCS) for the first
time in 2010. This survey provides a unique opportunity to analyse harmonised
information on household wealth in 17 Eurozone countries. Even though the
development over time will only be visible after the second wave of the survey in
2014, the HFCS provides the best prospects for future research on wealth
inequality in Europe.
Figure 19. Within/between-country decomposition of the evolution 
of the Theil index
Sources: EU-SILC, iAGS calculations.
2. This section is a contribution from the Austrian Institute AK Wien.
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The HFCS uses a rather narrow, “accounting-style” definition of wealth.
Wealth, according to this definition, consists of economic assets which can yield
returns. It must be possible to valuate and sell them, to use them as collateral for
loans, and to attribute them to persons. This means that a number of wealth cate-
gories are excluded, such as social assets (e.g., pay-as-you-go pension systems,
unemployment insurance, health insurance), environmental assets (e.g., clean
water, clean air, a lack of noise pollution), and human capital (i.e., the human
capacity to produce returns). The household balance includes assets and liabilities.
Assets include real assets (such as the main residence, additional real estate, vehi-
cles, and company shares) and financial assets (such as checking and savings
accounts, funds, stocks, and bonds). Liabilities include secured and unsecured
debts. The result of assets minus debts is net wealth.
Figure 20 shows the distribution of net wealth across the Eurozone. The
median household, which marks the line between the richest and the poorest half
of the population, has a net wealth of around 109.000 euros. However, the mean
net wealth of households is roughly 231.000 euros and hence lies significantly
above the median. This big difference is a first sign of an unequal distribution,
since some rich households pull up the mean. For the poorest 10 per cent of
households, assets just barely exceed liabilities; their nearly zero net wealth of
about 1,000 euros is not even visible in the graph. The net wealth of the bottom
5 per cent is actually negative, that is, they are indebted. At the other end of the
distribution, the bottom household of the top 10 per cent has a net wealth of
around 506.000 euros (ECB 2013).
Thanks to an ex-ante harmonisation of the survey design and the methods
used, the data is comparable across the Eurozone. However, it is important to
note that a comparison of absolute wealth levels, both of means but especially of
medians, is not a very useful undertaking. Since the data covers only private
Figure 20. Net wealth of selected percentiles
       Euros
Source: ECB 2013, p. 75, authors’ illustration.
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household wealth, demographic and differing institutional and political set-ups
between countries are likely to lead to varying levels of private wealth. For
instance, it is to be expected that countries with well-developed public housing or
pension systems reduce the need for private households to accumulate assets. For
example, far more than half the households in Spain, Portugal, Cyprus, or Slovakia
own their primary residence, while the majority of households in Germany and
Austria rent their home and consequently do not own any real estate.
Comparisons of absolute levels of private household wealth across Eurozone
countries are thus not likely to yield meaningful results. In contrast, the data is
well-suited to investigate the distribution of wealth between private households.
Figure 21 ranks countries by their Gini-coefficient for net wealth of private house-
holds. Comparing countries across Europe, Austria has the highest wealth
inequality, followed by Germany, Cyprus, and France, which also have a rather
unequal distribution of wealth. Slovakia has the lowest Gini of 0.45 index points,
but even there the distribution is skewed: the top 10 per cent own about a third
of the wealth. 
Another approach is to look at the contribution of different wealth categories
to the total inequality of wealth. In Belgium, unequal distribution of financial
assets is the main reason for wealth inequality. In countries such as Luxemburg,
Greece, or Slovakia it is real estate. In Germany, Austria, France, or Portugal, the
unequal distribution of business assets contributes the most to wealth inequality
(Sierminska and Medgyesi 2013).
An important aspect which needs to be considered in wealth surveys is the
potential under-reporting of wealth. The question is how well surveys with volun-
tary participation—as well designed as they may be—can cover the actual wealth
spectrum. For some countries, for example, administrative data is available from
wealth and inheritance taxes. For these cases, the hope is that state authorities
have consistently enforced the obligation to report and the full spectrum of trans-
Figure 21. Gini-coefficients of net wealth of private households, 2010
Gini coefficient                                                                                                  
Source: Sierminska and Medgyesi 2013, p. 10.
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ferred assets is recorded. In wealth surveys based on voluntary participation,
researchers must be conscious of the fact that different positions in the distribu-
tions come with different probabilities to participate and reply. While experience
shows that this is also true for the bottom of the distribution, household non-
response is a much bigger problem at the top end. In addition, the probability of a
rich household to be drawn in a sample of a few thousand is extremely low, which
further exacerbates the underestimation of total wealth and of wealth inequality.
This weakness becomes tangible when comparing of HFCS data with infor-
mation from the Forbes Rich List (Vermeulen, 2014). The richest household in
the German part of the HFCS owns 76 million euros, while the “poorest” person
of the 52 Germans on the Forbes list has a wealth of 818 million euros. The data
for Austria shows an even more dramatic gap of 22 million (HFCS) and
1,560 million euros (Forbes). These examples show that the super-rich are not
represented in the data, which inevitably leads to distorted results. One possi-
bility to close this gap is to carefully estimate missing assets at the top end of the
distribution. The starting point for such an estimate is the so-called Pareto distri-
bution, which academic studies show describes the missing top of the wealth
distribution very well.
Vermeulen (2014) has done such estimations for a number of Eurozone coun-
tries. These provide lower and upper bounds for the bias due to under-reporting
of the largest fortunes, which are used to calculate corrected estimates
(Figure 22). According to HFCS data, the richest per cent in Germany owns a
share of 24 per cent of the total private wealth. After correcting for under-
reporting, this share is between 26 and 33 per cent. For other countries, the
correction shows that the concentration of wealth is probably significantly higher
than indicated by the HFCS data, as well.
Figure 22. Share of the richest 1% in the total net wealth 
of private households, 2010
Share in %                                                                                                                  
Source: Vermeulen 2014, p. 29.
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It needs to be emphasised that the HFCS was carefully prepared and imple-
mented both in terms of content and design, while drawing on many years of
experience of the US Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF). This included, for
instance, a comprehensive collection of metadata beyond personal interviews as
well as a thorough training of interviewers. Still, due to the difficulties in capturing
the high wealth households described above, results based on the HFCS represent
the lower limit of the actual concentration of wealth – but this lower level alone
already points to a concerning level of inequality.
The high Gini-values up to 0.77 in figure 21 show that inequality of wealth is
much higher than that of incomes. In all countries examined, the Gini-coefficients
of household wealth are higher than those of household incomes. ECB calcula-
tions also provide evidence for this fact. The richest 10 per cent of households
own more than 50 per cent of the total net wealth in the covered Eurozone coun-
tries. This concentration is much lower for household incomes, where the 10 per
cent of households with the highest incomes earn about 31 per cent of the total
income (ECB, 2013, p. 96).
As mentioned earlier, since the HFCS has only been conducted once so far, it
is not possible to assess the development of concentration of wealth over time.
However, in his book Capital in the Twenty-First Century, the French economist
Thomas Piketty has presented data on the distribution of wealth in Europe. His
calculations are based on long time series for France, Great Britain, Germany, and
Sweden. Piketty shows that in Europe the share of wealth owned by the top 1 per
cent has been growing slowly but steadily since the 1970s; he also warns that the
concentration of wealth might further exacerbate in the future (Piketty, 2014). 
The HFCS wealth survey shows that, so far, only little was known about
wealth in the Eurozone. While the distribution of income from employment is well
researched in many countries, until recently, researchers were rather in the dark
when it came to wealth. The reason for this is that tax authorities record incomes,
but the only source of information about wealth are surveys on a voluntary basis –
with all their advantages and disadvantages. Given how willingness of rich house-
holds to participate in surveys as HFCS is lacking, one partial solution would be to
make participation mandatory in future HFCS waves.
7. The fight against inequality and poverty
The analysis above shows an overall picture of a Europe that is not converging
but diverging, and the main driver for income divergence is not divergence within
countries but between countries. And while income is unequally distributed, but
inequality in wealth is much larger. 
The European labour market still suffers, with high levels of long-term unem-
ployment and a large share of young people that are unable to find a job. There is
a risk that the development will become structural, creating scars for a long time.
Poverty and material deprivation is rising, but more in some countries than others.
The divergence is therefore not only seen on a macroeconomic scale, but also the
living standards of Europeans are diverging. Some might argue that the rising
poverty and material deprivation are just driven by the cycle, but our analysis has
shown that austerity and changes in social protection expenditure have a signifi-
cant effect on severe material deprivation.
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In the chapter above our main focus has been on income and wealth inequali-
ties, inequalities on the labour marked, poverty and material deprivation. But there
are many other kinds of inequalities—such as inequality in education, health,
gender, race discrimination, crime exposure etc.—that are just as problematic.
Within a few years we could easily end up in a situation where large
inequality increases have occurred right in front of our noses, knowing that it
could have been prevented, if we had implemented decisive action. Knowledge
is power, ignorance is defeat. To reverse the trend in poverty, inequality and the
divergence between countries, we need to put the fight against poverty and
inequality firmly on the agenda. 
One of the main ideas behind the European Union was to enhance the
convergence among member states. The more divided the countries are, the
harder it is to create a common direction for the EU. Policy coordination, not least
in the fiscal area, becomes more difficult. Inequality should be fought not only
from a distributional perspective but also for the future of the European Union. A
union, particularly one that shares the same currency, has to serve equality and
cannot be maintained at the expense of rising inequality. The risk is a withdrawal
on national level, ending in breaking up the euro. 
Creating jobs through investment
European investment has fallen more than 400 billion euros since its 2007
peak, leaving Europe caught in an investment trap. Therefore, we urgently need
to stimulate investment for the purpose of job creation both in the short run as
well as in the long run. As shown above, poverty and material deprivation is
closely related to economic growth, unemployment and especially long-term
unemployment. It is therefore crucial that we manage to create more European
jobs in order to avoid a structural worsening of the labour market, though hyster-
esis effects, with continuing divergence and poverty increase as a consequence. 
The European commission has just presented an investment plan for Europe,
the so-called Juncker-plan. The plan is a step in the right direction, but is likely to
fail to deliver on its promises (see chapter 1 and 4). More still needs to be done
in order to prevent more people from being long term unemployed ending in
poverty and material deprivation. As outlined in chapters 1 and 4, there are still
several channels within the EU fiscal framework that can increase investment and
in this way boost growth and create jobs. Economic policy should address
austerity and deflation by the usual tools but the diverging underlying dynamic
requires much more. A coordinated wage policy would be an important counter-
weight (see chapter 5 of this report and iAGS 2014) and transition toward a low-
carbon economy could be a way to reignite prosperity in Europe (chapter 4 of
this report). Ultimately, public investment financed by money creation may be
resorted to (a scheme is proposed in chapter 3 of this report).
Active labour marked policies and increased education level
Increasing expenditures and effort on active labour market programs will also
reduce inequality and poverty. Passive labour market programs are traditionally
unemployment insurance schemes, whereas active labour market programs are
training activities and other reintegration policies targeted at the unemployed (as
opposed to a general training or education subsidy). Active programs may
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include education aiming at upgrading the skills of unemployed workers or
employment programs intended to prevent skill losses during the period of
unemployment. In other words, active labour market programs aim at securing
the employability of the unemployed in order to avoid scarring effects of long-
term unemployment. 
As already stated above child poverty is especially concerning. Ensuring that
parents are employed is therefore a crucial mechanism to reduce the risk of child
poverty. Policies that improve the conditions for low income families with children
will reduce child poverty. This could be seen in the form of higher labour partici-
pation among parents, including improved parental leave arrangements, which
makes it easier to return to work after maternity leave. Increasing the female
participation rate is also likely to reduce the risk of poverty for children. By
increasing the female participation we can increase employment and create more
equal opportunities for men and women. One way to make it more likely for
women to participate in the labour force is to develop the public childcare system.
By increasing the educational level for the weakest we can lift low-incomes
and in this way reduce inequality. The supply of unskilled labour is reduced rela-
tive to that of skilled labour. In this way it is possible to fight social inequality by
getting weaker groups employed and supporting their bargaining power on the
labour market. Increasing the education level will also benefit the large group of
unskilled or low skilled young people in Europe. More young people should have
at least an upper secondary education and more adults, especially those without
training, should have better opportunities to upgrade their skills through adult
and continuing education.
In chapter 1 we argued that the present European fiscal rules are putting pres-
sure on expenditure such as investments in education and active labour market
policies. These kind of social investments are investments that are changing the
long-term because they are investments in the future of Europe. Downgrading
social investments will therefore have long-lasting consequences for Europe (Palier
et al., 2011). One of the problems with the recently presented Junker-plan is that
it does not rely on such investment, despite the fact that such social investments
are clearly priorities in the Commission. Since the Junker-plan relies heavily on a
leverage effect (or multiplier effect) from private investments, by construction it
could not have included social investments. This underlines the limitation of these
hybrid (public-private) plans.   
Making Europe more equal by reforming the tax system
When it comes to poverty reduction and creating a more equal Europe,
looking at how we tax people is also important. Reforming the tax system in
Europe in order to make it fairer and more progressive, will not only have a direct
effect, it can also finance investments such as education or active labour market
policy, that will benefit lower-income groups. 
Kindermann et al. (2014) finds in a very recent study on US data that
increasing tax rates at the very top of the income distribution, for instance
among the top one percent earners, can both reduce tax burdens for the rest of
the population as well as increase social welfare, and reduce both income and
wealth inequality. Because tax burdens are increased for the top one percent
earners and decreased for the “bottom” 99 percent, the average consumption
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will increase, and inequality will decrease compared to a situation with no tax
change. Wealth inequality will also decrease. By taxing extraordinary high
income at a high rate, the source of the wealth concentration is being taxed at a
high rate, which will result in a significant decline in wealth inequality over time
(Kindermann et al. 2014).
Reforming income taxation is not the only way to go; other tax sources
should also be considered. An increase in property taxes should be considered.
First of all property is immobile, meaning that it is not the target of tax evasion.
Secondly the value of real estate is highly correlated with wealth, meaning that
higher taxes on property, means higher taxes in the top of the distribution. In
light of the dramatic inequality of wealth in Europe, an obvious demand is also to
raise wealth-related taxes in coordination. Apart from fairness considerations,
other aspects necessitating such a move are tight public budgets and the rela-
tively high tax burden on labour. Wealth-related taxes are also considered a
source of income for the funding of public services that has little or adverse
impact on economic growth, especially if raised EU-wide at low rates. The EU
should implement a common Financial Transaction Tax. Ten European countries
have already agreed on implementing the tax from 2014, but other European
countries should join the initiative. 
Finally the effort to combat tax evasion and tax havens should be strength-
ened. The European Commission has estimated that European countries annually
lose in the area of 1 trillion euros because of tax evasion EU-COM (2012). But tax
avoidance is not only a problem related to money transferred out of the EU. This
stresses that there is an urgent need for greater coordination of the European tax
systems. A lot can be done in order to unify taxation rules, creating common
legislation, a common tax base and creating transparency in the tax system. An
important first step in this direction is an automatic exchange of information to
combat tax evasion which is supported by the OECD (2014) and being imple-
mented in the EU. The goal must now be the consistent implementation of the
OECD agreement, which was signed by 51 states in October 2014, together with
the abolition of banking secrecy, at least in the EU.
But unhealthy tax competition in the EU is already a reality, where corporate
tax cuts in one country makes other countries follow, making it a 'race to the
bottom'. The result is a negative spiral with no winners, as countries follow each
other down, in an attempt to lure investments and businesses from each other.
The OECD has denounced “harmful Tax Competition” since 1998. Tax practices
that were defined as harmful were: “no or low effective tax rates”; “ring fencing of
regimes” (preferential tax regimes are partly or fully insulated from the domestic
markets to protect own economy); “lack of transparency”; “lack of effective
exchange of information” (OECD, 1998). It is therefore important to build a polit-
ical consensus on a higher degree of policy coordination for corporate taxation.
This could for done by implementing an EU wide strong inventory of income,
wealth and tax regimes (including advance tax ruling), with shared information
among member states. Disseminating anonymized comprehensive information
(like it has been seen in ECB’s recent wealth survey) is useful in order to
strengthen the public and scientific debate. Based on that, a framework proposi-
tion could be developed, where residents are taxed according to national law
avoiding double taxation and double no taxation. Wealth in one country would
be known to fiscal administration in the country of residence and taxed according
iAGS 2015 — independent Annual Growth Survey Third Report96
to prevailing fiscal rules. Multiple residency would not be allowed. Such a frame-
work would provide full transferability of social rights as these would be given as a
joint benefit of such common framework. Fiscal havens would be eradicated.
Minimum taxation levels could be secured, and the same could apply to firm taxa-
tion. Another approach could be only to engage willing countries, in the
enhanced cooperation procedure, in fiscal convergence. Residency would not be
an issue and common law would apply. Harmful fiscal competition could be dealt
between the core of common fiscal law countries and remaining countries.
One thing is for sure; the current challenges with the ongoing economic
crisis, the unhealthy corporate tax competition and tax evasion are best solved by
international cooperation, and the EU can play a central role in doing so. 
